Activism strategic trading and liquidity
Partnoy and Thomas (2007) find that hedge funds tend to trade more which may translate into an aggressive activist strategy in their portfolio companies. preserve liquidity, hedge fund managers must be more short-term oriented ( Agarwal, 1 Jul 2019 relative short-termism of their strategies (Brav et al. of activism is relatively insensitive to the level of activist trading profits. (2017) provide evidence that hedge fund activists exploit liquidity sales to purchase stock in target 2 Jan 2020 Liquidity is based on the number of contracts available to trade at the best which were punished in 2019 during a fight with activist investor Carl Icahn. head of U.S. equity and quantitative strategy at Bank of America. 5.3.2 Activism strategies in the German corporate governance environment . already mentioned, there is trade-off between control and liquidity with regard to
Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relation between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity, because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades (the activist trades in the opposite direction of noise traders) and thereby increases information asymmetry about the activist's intentions.
We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relation between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity, because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades Request PDF | Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity | We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed Activism, Strategic Trading, and Market Liquidity Kerry.E.Back Rice University Pierre Collin-Dufresne EPFL, SFI and CEPR Vyacheslav (Slava) Fos Boston College Tao Li City University Hong Kong Alexander Ljungqvist NYU and NBER March 22, 2016 Activism, Strategic Trading, and Market Liquidity 1/ 28
engagement strategies of activists and highlights the catalytic role played by the lead activist. be some pre-filing information leakage that prompts wolf pack trading.2 Large shareholders as monitors: is there a trade-off between liquidity.
Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relationship between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies, and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades (the activist trades in the opposite direction of noise traders) and thereby increases information asymmetry about the activist's intentions. Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relation between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity, because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades (the activist trades in the opposite direction of noise traders) and thereby increases information asymmetry about the activist's intentions. We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relation between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity, because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades Request PDF | Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity | We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed Activism, Strategic Trading, and Market Liquidity Kerry.E.Back Rice University Pierre Collin-Dufresne EPFL, SFI and CEPR Vyacheslav (Slava) Fos Boston College Tao Li City University Hong Kong Alexander Ljungqvist NYU and NBER March 22, 2016 Activism, Strategic Trading, and Market Liquidity 1/ 28
Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity · Vyacheslav Fos. PIerre Collin- Dufresne. Kerry Back. Tao Li. Alexander Ljungqvist. 10 March 2017. Read; Share .
23 Nov 2016 We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for [10] “Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity,” with Kerry Back, Pierre Collin- Dufresne, Tao Li, and Alexander Ljungquist Econometrica, Volume 86, Issue 4, Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity. Posted by Vyacheslav Fos, Boston College, on. Thursday, January 5, 2017. Comments Off on Activism, Strategic Speaker: Pierre Collin-Dufresne - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute. Event date: Thursday, 05 October 2017 12:30 pm 1 Nov 2018 Because liquidity and intervention are simultaneously determined, more noise trading can increase the information asymmetry about the activist's Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity · Vyacheslav Fos. PIerre Collin- Dufresne. Kerry Back. Tao Li. Alexander Ljungqvist. 10 March 2017. Read; Share .
1 Jul 2019 relative short-termism of their strategies (Brav et al. of activism is relatively insensitive to the level of activist trading profits. (2017) provide evidence that hedge fund activists exploit liquidity sales to purchase stock in target
investors typically make investments with an activist strategy already in mind. example, are suited to trading in highly liquid securities, while classic PE funds to shareholder activism strategies by explaining what they are and how they unlock shareholder value liquidity and trading constraints from regulatory bodies). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42 (03), 595-620, 2007. 28*, 2007. Activism, strategic trading, and liquidity. K Back, P Collin‐Dufresne, V Fos, T Li, Forensic Finance. Publications: "Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity" (with K. Back, P. Collin-Dufresne, V. Fos, and T. Li), Econometrica (forthcoming).
Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity. This paper consolidates and substantially extends the theory parts of two prior working papers: Back, Li, and Ljungqvist (2015) and Collin‐Dufresne and Fos (2015b). Overall, that activism also affects market liquidity is a link that has not been emphasized in the literature, where liquidity is typically taken to be exogenous and one to one with the amount of noise trading. Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relationship between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies, and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades (the activist trades in the opposite direction of noise traders) and thereby increases information asymmetry about the activist's intentions. Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relation between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity, because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades (the activist trades in the opposite direction of noise traders) and thereby increases information asymmetry about the activist's intentions. We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes.